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Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt and the 
Future of Abortion Regulation 
 
John A. Robertson* 
Abortion opponents in many states have succeeded in passing 
alleged health-related restrictions that reduce the availability of 
abortion while providing little actual health benefit. Their validity 
depends on how courts interpret the undue burden test of Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey: does a rational 
basis suffice or may judges assess the actual benefits of the law in light 
of the burdens it imposes on access to abortion? 
In Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, the most important 
abortion case since Casey, the Supreme Court opted for a benefits/
burdens balancing approach. A Texas statute, requiring abortion 
facilities to meet the standards of ambulatory surgical centers and 
providers to have admitting privileges in nearby hospitals, was facially 
invalid because it did little to protect health while making access to 
abortion more difficult for many women. 
The decision is a major setback for abortion foes as long as the 
Roe-Casey framework of abortion rights holds. It will invalidate most 
targeted regulation of abortion providers, and have implications in 
other areas, such as for laws banning abortion after twenty weeks. This 
Article analyzes the reasoning of the case, assesses whether its 
conclusions are justified, and shows its importance for other types of 
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abortion regulation until there is a seismic shift in the makeup of the 
Supreme Court.  
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Abortion has been a never-ending battleground in American law and politics 
since Roe v. Wade in 1973. The election of President Trump in 2016 has only 
intensified the strife, as it gives new hope to those who fight to see Roe overturned. 
With abortion opponents successful in many state legislatures, pro-choice advocates 
have depended on the courts for protection.1 As legal doctrine and restriction 
strategies have evolved, however, the willingness of courts to protect abortion rights 
outside of the core right has varied. A few circuit courts of appeal have been 
protective on those issues. Several others have found controversial restrictions that 
do not aim directly at reversing Roe to be valid.2 
Since Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,3 which in 1992 
reaffirmed the core right to terminate pregnancy up until viability, the Supreme 
 
1. See generally Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833 (1992); Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
2. See, e.g., infra note 13. 
3. Casey, 505 U.S. 833. 
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Court has seldom intervened.4 Yet in 2016 in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt,5 
the Court decided the most important abortion case since Casey. Hellerstedt  
gave substance to the undue burden test of Casey, and in doing so, handed a major 
setback to the antichoice movement. To understand its doctrinal significance and 
implications, one must begin with Casey.  
Before addressing the provenance and importance of Hellerstedt, one must 
recognize that its precedential power depends on how long the Roe and Casey 
framework for abortion rights survives. With the Trump presidency, new justices 
appointed to the Court are likely to be pro-life, committed to some form of 
originalism, and likely opposed to abortion rights. However, it will take some time 
to reverse Roe v. Wade. With President Trump’s first appointee, Justice Neil 
Gorsuch, replacing Justice Scalia, there remains a 5-4 majority for the basic abortion 
right and for the Hellerstedt interpretation of Casey’s undue burden test. Justice 
Kennedy is eighty years old and Justice Ginsburg is eighty-four years old. If either 
retires during President Trump’s tenure, a justice with views similar to Gorsuch/
Scalia is likely to be appointed, which would in theory give the Court a majority of 
justices ill-disposed to abortion rights. 
Even then, that reversal would not occur overnight. A case challenging a 
twenty-week limit on abortion could move the viability restriction earlier without 
necessarily overturning a right to abortion before twenty weeks.6 A more direct 
attack on Roe would arise if a state passed a law that banned almost all abortions. 
Even then, it might require a circuit split to land on the Court’s docket. If it does, 
the new justices will have to ignore stare decisis to overturn the case, and then also 
decide how much power over abortion to return to government.7 The ultimate fate 
of Hellerstedt will thus depend on the speed at which justices retire, the views of new 
members, their willingness to reach out to eviscerate Roe and Casey, and how they 
go about unraveling those decisions. Until then, Hellerstedt is likely to remain an 
important limit on health and fetal protection legislation. 
I. PLANNED PARENTHOOD V. CASEY AND THE BACKGROUND OF HELLERSTEDT 
After President Reagan made four appointments to the Court in the 1980s and 
early 1990s, many expected Casey to be the death knell for Roe v. Wade’s 
constitutional right to abortion.8 In Casey, however, three of the four Republican 
 
4. The main exception has been partial birth abortion. After striking down a state ban in Stenberg 
v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000), the Court upheld a federal ban on partial birth abortion in Gonzales, 
550 U.S. at 168. 
5. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). 
6. Such a decision would not redefine viability, but rather find a new basis—such as 
sentience—as a limit. See infra notes 9–14 and accompanying text. 
7. For example, whether exceptions for the life and health of the mother must be recognized. 
8. Many thought that Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989), prefigured 
this demise. See John A. Robertson, The Future of Early Abortions, 75 A.B.A. J. 72, 74 (1989). Chief 
Justice Rehnquist’s plurality opinion asserted that the right to abortion was a “liberty interest protected 
by the Due Process clause” subject to restriction by any laws that would permissibly further a rational 
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appointees, Justices Sandra Day O’Connor, David Souter, and Anthony Kennedy, 
found an intermediate position that upheld the core right of Roe—a right to 
terminate a pregnancy up until viability—but demolished its rigid trimester 
regulatory framework.9 In place of trimesters, it fashioned the “undue burden” 
test—is the purpose or effect of a restriction to place a substantial obstacle on access 
to abortion—without further specification.10 Under this test, Casey upheld 
regulations that City of Akron v. Akron Reproductive Center 11 and other cases had 
invalidated on the basis of Roe. Now, states could show “respect” for prenatal life 
and ensure the “autonomy” of pregnant woman through waiting periods and 
mandated information about the gestational stage of the fetus and alternatives to 
abortion. 
Inspired by Casey, the antiabortion movement adopted strategies to limit 
abortion as much as they could within the confines of Casey. One approach was to 
implement the informed consent and waiting periods that case had blessed. At least 
twenty states enacted twenty-four- to forty-eight-hour waiting periods and a menu 
of risks of abortion (some of which were highly questionable).12 Later several states 
adopted mandatory ultrasound laws, most of which were held valid under Casey and 
the First Amendment.13 
 
state interest such as protecting potential life. Webster, 492 U.S. at 520. He noted that this would require 
the court to “modify and narrow Roe and succeeding cases.” Id. at 521. Justice Scalia wrote a concurring 
opinion that argued that the Court ought to have overturned Roe, rather than attempting to uphold 
both Roe and the laws at issue and agreed with Justice Blackmun’s assertion that the approach of the 
plurality would make Roe a dead letter. Id. at 532. 
9. Their three votes, together with those of Justices Stevens and Blackmun, constituted a 
majority for the core rights of Roe. Casey, 505 U.S. at 843–44. Antonin Scalia, the fourth Republican 
appointee, joined the other three dissenters. Id. at 844. 
10. The precise language is: “An undue burden exists, and therefore a provision of law is invalid, 
if its purpose or effect is to place substantial obstacles in the path of a woman seeking an abortion 
before the fetus attains viability.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 837. However, some guidance follows from its 
statement four sentences later that “unnecessary health regulations that have the purpose or effect of 
presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion impose an undue burden on the right.” 
Id. 
11. Justice O’Connor in her dissent first outlined the undue burden test later recognized  
in Casey. See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 453 (1983) (O’Connor,  
J., White, J., & Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
12. See Cynthia R. Daniels et al., Informed or Misinformed Consent? Abortion Policy in the United 
States, 41 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 181 (2016) (discussing findings of a comprehensive study of 
state informed consent materials, including finding that approximately one-third of statements were 
medically inaccurate). 
13. Ultrasound laws posed special problems. While ultrasound images provided truthful 
information, laws requiring patients who refused to view them to hear the doctor’s description of fetal 
parts and fetal heartbeat seemed to be coercive. Yet several courts of appeal upheld them. See, e.g.,  
Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2012). The exception 
was the Fourth Circuit, which invalidated the North Carolina ultrasound law on the ground that state 
interest—protecting fetal life, protecting pregnant women’s psychological health, and ensuring the 
choice is well informed—is outweighed by the physician’s right to free speech. See Stuart v. Camnitz, 
774 F.3d 238, 250 (4th Cir. 2014). 
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A second strategy was to ban “partial birth” abortions (intact dilation and 
extraction (D&E)).14 Unknown until the 1990s, and rarely used even in late second 
trimester cases, abortion opponents abhorred the intact D&E technique. The legs 
and torso of the fetus were removed whole from the woman and then its skull was 
crushed in the birth canal to ease removal.15 The Court struck down state bans on 
partial birth abortion in 2000 in Stenberg v. Carhart because those laws were so 
broadly written that they also banned some standard second trimester D&Es, and 
had no exception for the life or health of the woman.16 In 2002, Congress enacted 
a more carefully drafted ban, including specific findings of fact that asserted that 
no life or health exception was ever needed.17 The Court upheld the new law in 
Gonzales v. Carhart, finding that Congress had cured earlier drafting woes and had 
not imposed an undue burden because other alternatives were available and no 
health exception was needed.18 Even though the Court noted that doctors disagreed 
about whether there was ever a medical need for the procedure, the Court 
recognized the legislature’s discretion to resolve disputed medical and scientific 
matters was sufficient to withstand facial attack by those doctors in favor of the 
technique.19 
A third strategy focused on alleged “common sense” measures20 to regulate 
abortion clinics for health and safety. Although the vast majority of abortions, which 
occur in the first trimester, are in already regulated clinics and are overwhelmingly 
safe, these laws targeted the credentials, staffing, and operation of abortion facilities 
in the name of protecting the health and safety of women. Such Targeted Regulation 
of Abortion Provider (“TRAP”) laws made it more difficult for many clinics to 
 
14. A ban on partial birth abortion was arguably consistent with Casey’s reaffirmation of Roe 
because it prohibited only one abortion technique when others were available. 
15. See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 927. 
16. 530 U.S. 914. Justice Kennedy dissented on the ground that the legislature should have 
discretion to assess medical evidence. Id. at 956 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). This point became a key 
factor in his opinion in Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 165, upholding a federal ban on intact dilation and 
evacuation. 
17. See Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2003). 
18. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 164 (noting that “an injection that kills the fetus” in utero enables a 
doctor to perform intact D&E on a dead fetus and thus avoid the statute’s prohibition of delivery of 
“a living fetus”). 
19. Id. While as-applied attacks were still possible, it would be extremely difficult for a woman 
faced with a need for a late second trimester abortion, which usually becomes known just before the 
procedure is needed, to have the time or money to muster the legal resources for one. See id. at 189–90 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
20. Abortion opponents viewed the Texas restrictions as “common sense safety standards 
regularly followed by facilities that perform invasive outpatient surgeries and requiring doctors who 
perform abortions to have admitting privileges at a nearby hospital.” Elizabeth Slattery & Roger 
Severino, Supreme Court Puts Abortion Industry Profits over Women’s Safety, THE DAILY SIGNAL ( June 
27, 2016), http://dailysignal.com/2016/06/27/supreme-court-strikes-down-commonsense-abortion-
clinic-safety-standards/ [https://perma.cc/7VHU-PXML]. To disallow them would prevent “state 
legislators [from making] common sense judgments about how to regulate the abortion 
industry . . . .” See id. Of course, whether they qualified as “common sense” depended on how much 
they actually improved health in light of the burdens they imposed on access. 
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operate, and in some states reduced greatly the number of abortion clinics and 
women’s access.21 
Texas, like twenty-five other states, adopted a TRAP law in its 2013 House 
Bill 2 (H.B. 2).22 Among its provisions were requirements that doctors performing 
abortions have admitting privileges in a hospital within thirty miles and that abortion 
clinics meet the standards for ambulatory surgical centers (ASCs). In September 
2013, several Texas abortion providers obtained a declaratory judgment that the 
admitting privilege requirement of H.B. 2 was facially unconstitutional.23 On appeal, 
the Fifth Circuit reversed the decision in significant part.24 Justice Scalia 
subsequently refused the plaintiff’s application to vacate before the Supreme 
Court.25 Although Justice Breyer wrote the majority opinion, as in Casey and 
Gonzales, Justice Kennedy’s vote was key. 
One week after the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Abbott I, many of the same 
providers filed a new complaint that facially attacked the ASC requirement. That 
complaint also made an as-applied attack against the admitting privilege requirement 
upheld in Abbott I against the McAllen and El Paso clinics.26 The District Court 
granted an injunction on both claims. The Fifth Circuit reversed Lakey on the ASC 
claim,27 but this time the Supreme Court issued a stay and accepted the plaintiffs’ 
petition for certiorari.28 The Supreme Court reviewed as a whole the Fifth Circuit 
decisions in both Abbott I and Lakey. On June 27, 2016, the Supreme Court issued 
the decision of the court in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt.29 
II. WHEN IS A BURDEN “UNDUE?” 
The key issue in Hellerstedt was whether Casey’s undue burden test, adopted 
for health restrictions on abortion, allowed courts to weigh the importance of the 
health goals of the law versus its burdens on women.30 District courts and courts of 
appeals had developed two positions on these questions. One was that balancing 
burdens and benefits was essential to determine whether the burden imposed by 
 
21. See Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers, GUTTMACHER INST., https://www. 
guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/targeted-regulation-abortion-providers [https://perma.cc/ 
HZU8-LQKV] (last visited on Feb. 1, 2017). 
22. H.B. 2, 83rd Leg., 2nd C.S., Ch. 1 (Tex. 2013) (West). Final passage of the law was delayed 
by Senator Wendy Davis’ twenty-four-hour filibuster against the law. See Manny Fernandez, Filibuster 
in Texas Senate Tries to Halt Abortion Bill, N.Y. TIMES ( June 25, 2013), http://nyti.ms/1OsGHaO. 
23. See Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 951 F. Supp. 2d 
891 (W.D. Tex. 2013), rev’d in part, 748 F.3d 583 (5th Cir. 2014). 
24. Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott (Abbott I ), 748 F.3d 
583 (5th Cir. 2014). 
25. Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 134 S. Ct. 506 (2013). 
26. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673 ( W.D. Tex. 2014). 
27. Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam), modified, 790 
F.3d 598 (5th Cir. 2015), rev’d, Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292. 
28. See Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292. 
29. Id. 
30. See id. at 2300. 
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the regulation was “undue.”31 The opposite view was that as long as no substantial 
impact on access occurred, a rational basis for the legislature would suffice.32 
The Fifth Circuit had adopted this highly deferential rational basis approach 
in its Hellerstedt opinion.33 Under this approach, a law is constitutional if it does not 
have the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman 
seeking an abortion and “is reasonably related to (or designed to further) a legitimate 
state interest.”34 If there was medical uncertainty about the issue, its “resolution [is 
for] legislatures, not the courts.”35 The opposite view, used by the district court in 
Hellerstedt and district courts in Illinois, Alabama, and Arizona,36 allowed courts to 
assess the importance of the health interest in light of the burdens imposed on 
access to determine whether they were “undue.” In doing so, they could also review 
legislative findings to determine whether they provided factual support for the 
state’s health goal. 
The Supreme Court resolved the question in favor of petitioners by citing 
language in Roe, Casey, and Gonzales that it perceived as permitting such 
assessments.37 It quoted Roe’s recognition that the “[s]tate has a legitimate interest 
in seeing to it that abortion . . . is performed under circumstances that insure 
maximum safety for the patient.”38 It then used Casey to say that “a statute which, 
while furthering [a] valid state interest, has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle 
in the path of a woman’s choice cannot be considered a permissible means of 
serving its legitimate ends.”39 It noted that “[u]necessary health regulations that have 
 
31. Id. at 2303. 
32. Courts may have adopted this approach because of a statement in Gonzales v. Carhart that 
“[w]here it has a rational basis to act, and it does not impose an undue burden, the State may use its 
regulatory power to bar certain procedures and substitute others, all in furtherance of its legitimate 
interests in regulating the medical profession in order to promote respect for life, including the life of 
the unborn.” 550 U.S. at 158. However, this statement refers to medical procedures and not provider 
and clinic regulations. 
33. Cole, 790 F.3d at 567. 
34. Id. at 572. 
35. Id. at 587. (citing Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 163). 
36. Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 94 F. Supp. 3d 949, 953 ( W.D. Wis. 2015), 
aff’d sub nom. Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Schimel, 806 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2015); Planned 
Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Strange, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1330, 1378 (M.D. Ala. 2014). Planned Parenthood Ariz., 
Inc. v. Humble, 753 F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 2014), used a similar approach in enjoining a state ban on 
medication abortions. 
37. The Court reached this question only after finding that the petitioners’ claim was not barred 
by res judicata. It found Justice Alito’s dissent on this point “simply wrong.” Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 
2306. In addition to its own analysis, the Court also cited an amicus brief by Michael Dorf and 
professors in civil procedure from Cornell Law School, New York University Law School, Columbia 
Law School, University of Chicago Law School, and Duke University Law School. See id. at 2309; see 
also Brief for Constitutional Law Scholars Bhagwat et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Cole, 
790 F.3d 563 (No. 15-274). 
38. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2309. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973), also stated that “a 
State may regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the 
preservation and protection of maternal health.” The question of how strict the “reasonably relates” 
requirement scrutiny is that lies at the heart of Hellerstedt. 
39.  Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2309 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 877). 
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the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an 
abortion impose an undue burden on the right.”40 Based on these statements, the 
Court of Appeals’s allegiance to the rational basis view was incorrect because “[t]he 
rule announced in Casey . . . requires that courts consider the burdens a law imposes 
on abortion access together with the benefits those laws confer.”41 It followed then 
that the Court of Appeals was wrong in equating “the judicial review applicable to 
the regulation of a constitutionally protected personal liberty with the less strict 
review applicable where, for example, economic legislation is at issue.”42 As a result, 
“[t]he Court of Appeals’ approach simply does not match the standard that this 
Court laid out in Casey, which asks courts to consider whether any burden imposed 
on abortion access is ‘undue.’”43 
The Court also found that courts may review whether the facts developed in 
challenges to legislation were sufficient to sustain the law.44 It cited Casey’s use of 
the factual findings of the district court and research-based submission of amici to 
find that that the prevalence of spousal abuse was so great that a spousal notice 
requirement for abortion erected an undue burden on access.45 It also cited 
Gonzales’s recognition that the “Court retains an independent constitutional duty to 
review factual findings where constitutional rights are at stake.”46 When district 
court findings contradict legislative findings, “[u]ncritical deference to Congress’ 
factual findings . . . is inappropriate.”47 
Although H.B. 2 itself did not make factual findings, the Court inferred that 
the legislation had sought to further the constitutionally acceptable objective of 
protecting a woman’s health.48 Given the Court’s view that its cases did not leave 
questions of medical uncertainty wholly to the legislature, the district court had 
acted properly in determining whether the law actually advanced those objectives. 
In doing so, the district court (and now the majority) was not simply substituting its 
own judgment for that of the legislature, as Justice Thomas argued in dissent, but 
applying a more hands-on standard of review.49 Having considered evidence in the 
 
40. Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 878). 
41. Id. 
42. Id. It cited Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955), as an example of 
the deferential approach to economic regulation. 
43. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2310. 
44. See id. 
45. Id. (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 888–94). 
46. In Gonzales, however, the legislature was entitled to decide differences of medical opinion 
as it chose because there were alternative ways to terminate the pregnancy. 550 U.S. at 163. 
47. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2310 (quoting Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 166). 
48. Id. 
49. See id. at 2324–25. Of course whenever a court finds insufficient evidence to support 
legislative impingement of a constitutional right, it is replacing the legislative judgment with its own. 
But in Hellerstedt, the legislature had adopted and the Fifth Circuit upheld the law on a mere rational 
basis, without examining whether the presumed health benefit actually existed. The different judgment 
of the District and then Supreme Court was based on applying a different standard of review to the 
facts developed at trial. The Court left open the question of how in closer cases the balancing should 
be done, i.e., would a preponderance of benefits outweigh the burden on access, or must the state have 
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record, the district court then weighed the asserted benefits against the burdens, as 
the Court now found that Casey instructed. As a result, the Court held that in doing 
so, “[t]he [d]istrict [c]ourt applied the correct legal standard.”50 
The Court’s closer scrutiny of the state’s health interest under the undue 
burden test in light of the access burdens on women is more consistent with the 
role of courts in constitutional litigation than a highly deferential, hands-off 
review.51 If Casey were read to mean that a rational basis and no substantial obstacle 
would sustain abortion-restrictive legislation, regulation that could not meet any 
closer scrutiny would invariably survive. The idea that some regulations were 
“unnecessary” and thus created an “undue burden” because they contributed so 
little to actual health made sense. If there was no actual benefit, then more than de 
minimis burdens, even if not a substantial obstacle, would be “undue.” To hold 
otherwise would remove most judicial scrutiny of legislation in the abortion area 
and impair the dignity, not only of women, but of law itself.52 While a low level of 
scrutiny may be tolerable with economic, social, and commercial matters, it robs 
fundamental rights, such as autonomy in choosing not to procreate, of the greater 
“momentum [of ]  respect”53 which they deserve. 
It bears mentioning that a similar balancing approach has been adopted in 
cases involving indirect burdens on voting rights. Instead of having to meet strict 
scrutiny, the Court in Anderson v. Celebrezze54 and Burdick v. Takushi 55 upheld voting 
restrictions that did not “unreasonably” burden the right to vote in light of the 
state’s “important regulatory interests.”56 Such a standard requires courts to balance 
 
to meet a higher standard for showing that the health benefits outweighed the burden on access? Would 
this be a form of intermediate scrutiny? I am indebted to Lynn Blais for this point. 
50. Id. at 2310. 
51. Simply determining whether there was a rational basis for legislation had been the basis for 
Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Roe, 410 U.S. at 171. He reiterated it in subsequent cases. See, e.g., Webster, 
492 U.S. at 490. 
52. Linda Greenhouse & Reva Siegel, Casey and the Clinic Closings: When “Protecting Health” 
Obstructs Choice, 125 YALE L.J. 1428, 1480 (2016). Their full statement on this point is: 
We have frequently referred here to women’s dignity as a value that Casey sought to protect. 
At this crucial juncture in the never-ending abortion controversy, we suggest that courts 
must also be attentive to another claim to dignity: the dignity of law itself. If the decision 
announced nearly a generation ago under an intense public spotlight can be so easily 
manipulated and evaded, among the betrayed will be not only the women of America, but 
the understanding that Casey affirmed: that constitutional law matters, and matters especially 
in those precincts where we most deeply disagree. 
Id. at 1480. 
53. Recall Justice White’s statement in Griswold v. Connecticut, that “[s]urely the right invoked 
in this case, to be free of regulation of the intimacies of the marriage relationship, ‘come[s] to this Court 
with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from shifting 
economic arrangements.’” 381 U.S. 479, 502–03 (1965) ( White, J., concurring) (quoting Kovacs  
v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949)). 
54. 460 U.S. 780, 806 (1983) (third-party presidential ballot requirements burdens voters’ 
freedom of choice and freedom of expression unquestionably outweigh the State’s interest in imposing 
a March deadline). 
55. 504 U.S. 428, 441 (1992) (write-in votes in presidential election may be prohibited). 
56. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434. 
Final to Printer_Robertson (Do Not Delete) 3/14/2018  8:40 AM 
632 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:623 
the importance of the state’s regulatory interest in light of the burdens imposed, as 
Hellerstedt has interpreted Casey’s “undue burden” test to require. The Fourth 
Circuit applied this approach in striking down North Carolina’s voter identification 
requirements in N.C. Conference of NAACP v. McCroy, on the ground in part that 
the law provided “inapt remedies . . . for [voter fraud] problems . . . that did not 
exist.”57 Hellerstedt’s balancing approach to abortion restrictions both reflects voting 
right cases and may influence them in turn. 
III. UNDUE BURDEN: ADMITTING PRIVILEGES REQUIREMENT 
Having established that the undue burden test permits judicial inquiry into the 
importance of the state’s health interest, the Court then turned to the district court’s 
evaluation of the evidence, first for the admitting privileges requirement, and then 
for the surgical center standards.58 For each requirement, the court analyzed the 
evidence showing whether or not there was a health benefit, and then to what extent 
the requirement placed a substantial obstacle to access to abortion.59 This approach 
was fact-intensive, based on evidence in the record and several amici briefs from 
medical and hospital professionals. The dissents questioned several of the majority’s 
conclusions, but those arguments were not sufficient to disturb the Court’s 
conclusion that the district court’s findings were adequate to uphold a facial attack 
on H.B. 2.60 
A. Does the Hospital Admitting Privileges Requirement Advance Health? 
With regard to the admitting privileges requirement, the Court first noted that 
before H.B. 2 Texas already had a law that required abortion providers to “have 
admitting privileges or have a working arrangement with a physician(s) who has 
admitting privileges at a local hospital in order to ensure the necessary back up for 
medical complications.”61 The new law required that providers themselves have 
admitting privileges at a hospital within thirty miles of the clinic, but the district 
court found that this mandate served no real health need and made abortion access 
more difficult, thus imposing an “undue” burden on a woman’s right to abortion.62 
 
57. N.C. State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 214 (4th Cir. 2016), rev’g and 
remanding 182 F. Supp. 3d 320 (M.D.N.C.). 
58. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2310, 2314. 
59. By focusing on the actuality of the health benefit and degree of burden, the majority decided 
the case on the effects, not the purpose, prong of the undue burden case. However, purpose had been 
argued in the courts below and in the Supreme Court on the theory that a law that added so little to 
health must have been adopted for the purpose of stopping abortion. Rather than get into the 
entanglements of purpose analysis, the Court simply avoided the question. See Palmer v. Thompson, 
403 U.S. 217 (1971); see also Priscilla J. Smith, If the Purpose Fits: The Two Functions of Casey’s Purpose 
Inquiry, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1135, 1136 (2014). 
60. See Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2321–53 (Thomas, J., and Alito, J., dissenting). 
61. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2310. 
62. Id. at 2310–11 (citing TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.0031(a) ( West 2015)). 
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The majority in Hellerstedt upheld the district court’s finding that there were 
no actual health benefits from the law.63 First, abortion in Texas was “extremely 
safe with particularly low rates of serious complications and virtually no deaths 
occurring on account of the procedure.”64 Serious complications requiring hospital 
admission were less than one-quarter of one percent of abortions. Other 
complications rarely required hospital admission, much less immediate transfer to a 
hospital from an outpatient clinic, and if they do occur, the quality of care that the 
patient receives is not affected by whether the abortion provider has admitting 
privileges at the hospital.65 
Second, expert testimony showed that when complications occur, they occur 
in the days after the abortion and not on the spot at the clinic.66 This is especially 
true for medication abortions, which occur after the patient has taken a medication 
in the clinic and has left the facility. In cases in which complications occur, patients 
are likely to seek medical attention at a hospital near their home. In short, the Court 
found nothing in the record evidence to show that the new law advanced Texas’s 
legitimate interest in protecting health. 
Third, hospital credentialing placed “a substantial obstacle in the path of a 
woman’s choice” without a corresponding health benefit.67 The Court found that 
it was often impossible for abortion doctors to receive hospital credentials68 for 
reasons other than their medical competence. It noted that privileges were granted 
on the basis of the applicant’s number of admissions per year, and did not operate 
as a second check on the credentials or skill of abortion providers, as the state had 
asserted below.69 With abortions yielding so few complications, doctors performing 
them would not be able to meet minimum admission requirements. The amicus 
brief of the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology confirmed that 
hospital privileges were not granted on ability or qualifications, but admission 
numbers, and thus did not serve “any relevant credentialing function” for abortion 
providers who rarely sought hospital admission for their patients.70 
B. Burden on Access 
The Court also agreed with the district court that the admitting privileges 
requirement caused clinics to close, without a corresponding health benefit. After 
this provision went into effect on September 1, 2015, the number of abortion 
facilities dropped from forty to about twenty. The record contained sufficient 
 




67. At oral argument Texas admitted that there was nothing in the record that of even a single 
case in which “the new requirement would have helped even one woman obtain better treatment.”  
Id. at 2311–12. 
68. Id. at 2312. 
69. Id. at 2312 (citation omitted). 
70. Id. at 2313. 
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evidence that the privileges requirement led to the closure of about half of Texas 
clinics.71 These closures meant fewer doctors, longer waiting times, and increased 
crowding. With fewer clinics, the number of women of reproductive age living more 
than 150 miles from a clinic increased from 86,000 to 400,000, and those more than 
200 miles away increased from 10,000 to 290,000.72 While the Court, citing Casey, 
found that increased driving times do not always constitute an undue burden,73 they 
could not be ignored. Taken together with the scheduling and delay burdens that 
the closings brought about and the virtual absence of any health benefits, the district 
court’s undue burden analysis was correct. 
Justice Alito’s counter-argument in dissent was evidentiary. He argued that 
some clinics may have closed for other reasons, such as physician retirement, so all 
closures should not be counted as a burden created by the law.74 But the Court 
rejected this speculation because so many clinic closures occurred around the time 
the admitting privileges requirement took effect. Whether other evidence not 
presented at trial or credited by the district court might have shown that some clinics 
closed for unrelated reasons did not provide a sufficient ground to disturb the 
district court’s finding on that issue. 
Justice Alito also suggested that the hospital privileges requirement may have 
forced unsafe facilities to shut down, pointing to the Kermit Gosnell scandal in 
Pennsylvania.75 Gosnell was convicted of first degree murder of a child who was 
born alive after an abortion procedure and manslaughter by omission of an abortion 
patient, who died after a procedure. He also was accused of permitting unlicensed 
and indifferent workers to practice unsupervised and to work in dirty facilities with 
unsanitary instruments.76 The Court agreed that Gosnell’s conduct was deplorable, 
but did not find that an extra layer of regulation would have affected his behavior.77 
Preexisting Texas law already contained detailed regulations covering abortion 
facilities, including a requirement that facilities be inspected at least annually. It 
found nothing in the record to suggest that H.B. 2 would be more effective than 
preexisting Texas law at deterring wrongdoers like Gosnell from criminal behavior. 
Thus, there was little health benefit from the admitting privilege requirement and a 




73. The Casey plurality in upholding the Pennsylvania twenty-four-hour waiting period had 
accepted the District Court finding that some women had to drive 150 miles each way and stay 
overnight to satisfy that requirement. Id. (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 833). 
74. Id. at 2344. 
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IV. UNDUE BURDEN—SURGICAL CENTER REQUIREMENT 
The Court applied a similar fact-intensive analysis to the ambulatory surgical 
center (ASC) standards requirement.79 It found that the ASC standards did little to 
protect health, and that the regulation limited access to abortion.80 
A. Do ASC Standards for Abortion Clinics Promote Health? 
As with admitting privileges, the Court noted that Texas law already heavily 
regulated abortion clinics with requirements for recordkeeping, reporting, quality 
assurance, staffing, infection control, environmental protection, and anesthesia 
standards.81 These regulations were policed by random and announced annual 
inspections and could be enforced with administrative, civil and criminal penalties, 
and injunctions. H.B. 2 added additional detailed requirements relating to the size 
of the nursing staff, building dimensions, surgical suites, preoperative holding and 
postoperative recovery rooms, corridors of wider width, and piping and plumbing 
requirements. All were costly to add and appeared to improve safety marginally, if 
at all, for most abortion patients.82 
The Court found “considerable evidence in the record supporting the [d]istrict 
[c]ourt’s findings indicating that . . . statutory provision requiring all abortion 
facilities to meet all surgical-center standards does not benefit patients and is not 
necessary.”83 The risks were not lowered for patients who underwent abortions in 
ambulatory surgery centers as compared to nonsurgical facilities. As the district 
court put it, women “will not obtain better care or experience more frequent 
positive outcomes at an ambulatory surgical center as compared to a previously 
licensed facility.”84 The Court found this conclusion well supported both by record 
evidence and amici briefs. For example, the requirement that even medical abortions 
occur in a surgical center provides no benefit since complications, if any, almost 
always arise after the patient has left the facility. 
The record also showed substantial discrimination between what was required 
of abortion clinics and other settings in which higher risk procedures occur. 
Abortions in abortion facilities are not only safe, but also safer than the numerous 
outpatient procedures that are not subject to the surgical center requirement. 
Nationwide childbirth is fourteen times more likely to result in death, but Texas 
allows a midwife to oversee childbirth in the patient’s own home.85 Colonoscopy, 
 
79. See id. at 2314–15. 
80. Id. at 2321. 
81. Id. at 2314. 
82. Id. at 2314–15. 
83. Id. at 2315. 
84. Id. (citing Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d at 684). 
85. The Court also noted that death from abortion has occurred only once in every 120,000–
140,000 abortions, or one every two years. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2313. By contrast, 148 women in 
Texas died from pregnancy-related causes in 2012, up from seventy-two deaths in 2011. Maternal deaths 
in developed countries are roughly twelve per 100,000 live births. In Texas, the number was 35.8 deaths 
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which typically occurs outside of a hospital or surgery center, has a mortality rate 
ten times higher than that of abortion, while liposuction, another typical outpatient 
procedure, is twenty-eight times more dangerous than abortion.86 Medical 
procedures after miscarriage often involve a procedure equivalent to that involved 
in a nonmedical abortion, but they often take place outside of a hospital or surgery 
center. The Court found that this regulatory disparity was not based on differences 
that are reasonably related to protecting women’s health, the ostensible purpose of 
the law.87 
Moreover, many of the requirements are inappropriate as applied to surgical 
abortions, such as requiring scrub facilities, one-way traffic patterns throughout the 
facility, and special pre-op and post-op waiting areas. Nor are filtration and 
humidity requirements that aim to reduce infection when doctors penetrate the skin 
applicable to abortions, which typically involve either the administration of 
medicines or procedures performed through the natural opening of the birth canal, 
which is itself not sterile.88 Similarly, emergency provisions for deeply sedated 
patients are not relevant to abortion, which typically does not involve general 
anesthesia or deep sedation.89 
The upshot of the record evidence was to provide ample support for the 
district court’s conclusion that “[m]any of the building standards mandated by the 
[A]ct and its implementing rules have such a tangential relationship to patient safety 
in the context of abortion as to be nearly arbitrary.”90 In short, the surgery center 
requirement “will not [provide] better care or . . . more positive outcomes.”91 
Therefore, “[t]he record evidence thus supports the ultimate legal conclusion that 
the surgical-center requirement is not necessary.”92 
B. The Burdens of the ASC Requirement 
At the same time, the Court concluded that the record provided adequate 
evidentiary support for the conclusion that the surgical center requirement placed a 
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion.93 The parties 
stipulated that the requirement would reduce the number of abortion facilities to 
seven or eight, located in Houston, Austin, Dallas, Fort Worth, and San Antonio. 
 
per 100,000 live births in Texas in 2014 (400,000 live births annually). Brittney Martin, Pregnancy-Related 
Deaths in State Double, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Aug. 22, 2016, at B1. 
86. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2314. 
87. Although Texas partly waives or grandfathers the surgical center requirements for about 
two-thirds of the facilities to which the new surgical center standards apply, it never waived any of the 
new requirements or grandfathered any facilities that perform abortions. Id. at 2298–99. 
88. Two critics of Hellerstedt commented that, “In other words, the court is claiming a woman’s 
body is already unsanitary to a certain degree so no need to increase the cleanliness of the abortion 
environment and abortion instruments.” SLATTERY & SEVERINO, supra note 20. 
89. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2316. 
90. Id. (citing Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d at 684). 
91. Id. at 2315. 
92. Id. at 2316. 
93. Id. 
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The district court found that those seven or eight facilities could not meet the 
demand of the entire state.94 Yet the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found that this 
finding was “clearly erroneous” because it rested on the “ipse dixit of one expert,” 
and because there was no evidence that the current surgical centers for abortion 
were operating at full capacity.95 
The Court, however, found adequate support for the district court’s finding.96 
That expert said that as a result of the surgical center requirements, those seven 
clinics would have to increase their capacity from 14,000 abortions per year to 
60,000–70,000—a five factor increase.97 The district court found that the expert 
could offer his opinion if it were based on sufficient facts or data and reliable 
principles and methods.98 Since the expert had participated in research and review 
of studies and existing data, the district court determined that he met the Daubert 
standards for an expert witness.99 The Supreme Court agreed.100 
In addition, the Court relied on common sense, using as an example that if a 
store, apartment, or train served 200 customers a week, it was unlikely to be able to 
suddenly shift and serve 1000.101 Justice Alito’s dissent took issue with this 
conclusion, arguing that many places operate below capacity and could simply hire 
more providers to satisfy new demand.102 The Court noted, however, that medical 
facilities are well known for their waiting times and that it defied common sense to 
conclude that they could easily accommodate five times the number of patients.103 
Because petitioners had satisfied their burden, the obligation was on Texas, if it 
could, to present evidence rebutting the district court. Texas admitted on oral 
argument that it had presented no such evidence.104 
More fundamentally, the Court found that in the face of no threat to women’s 
health from the prior regulatory approach, the new requirements would not 
improve women’s health and instead might harm it.105 As Justice Breyer noted for 
the majority: 
Texas seeks to force women to travel long distances to get abortions in 
crammed-to-capacity superfacilities. Patients seeking those services are less 
 
94. Id. 
95. Id. (citing Cole, 790 F.3d at 590). 
96. Id. at 2316. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 2317 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)). This is true 
even if the expert had been previously wrong in one of his predictions about the effect of passage of 
H.B. 2. 
100. Id. at 2317. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. at 2347. 
103. Id. at 2317. 
104. Id. Texas noted that the increased capacity of a new Planned Parenthood facility in 
Houston was not typical of other clinics. Abortions were only one of the services provided there, so 
that the total cost of the new facility was not indicative of how easily a clinic could meet requirements. 
Id. at 2318. 
105. Id. at 2311–12. 
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likely to get the kind of individualized attention, serious conversation, and 
emotional support that doctors at less taxed facilities may have  
offered . . . . Surgical centers attempting to accommodate sudden, vastly 
increased demand . . . may find that quality of care declines.106 
With the cost of meeting the surgical-center standards so high—from $1 
million per facility with adequate space to $3 million (depending on whether new 
land must be purchased), capacity would not easily increase to accommodate the 
needs of Texas women.107 The Court thus agreed with the district court that the 
surgical-center requirement, like the admitting privileges requirement, provides few, 
if any, health benefits for women, poses a substantial obstacle to women seeking 
abortions, and thus constitutes an “undue burden” on their right to do so.108 
V. FACIAL ATTACK: SEVERABILITY AND LARGE FRACTION 
The Court also dealt with two additional arguments made by Texas and found 
neither persuasive.109 One was severability and the other was the number of women 
affected to warrant facial review. H.B. 2 had a very broad severability clause that 
applied to “every provision, section, subsection, sentence, clause, phrase or word in 
this Act.”110 Texas argued that even if some of the surgical-center provisions were 
invalid, others were not, and thus only the most burdensome ones should be struck 
down. 
The Court rejected this claim for a more narrowly tailored remedy, noting that 
“a severability clause is an aid merely; not an inexorable command.”111 Further, its 
prior cases had “never required us to proceed application by conceivable application 
when confronted with a facially unconstitutional statutory provision.”112 Strictly 
enforcing such a severability clause would impose on courts the duty to pick out the 
individual applications that were invalid, thus substituting judicial for legislative 
governance, and allow a legislature to insulate unconstitutional statutes from facial 
attack. Moreover, the costs would be high for courts and litigants, who would have 
to specify which of many provisions were valid and which were not, whenever a 
single application of a law might be valid. Texas’s attempt to broadly draft a 
requirement to sever “applications,” the Court concluded, “does not require us to 




107. Id. at 2318. 
108. Id. 
109. The state’s third argument relied on Simopolous v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506 (1983), in which 
the Court upheld a law requiring second trimester abortions be performed in a hospital. The Hellerstedt 
Court distinguished it on the ground that it involved second trimester abortions, and not all abortions 
as H.B. 2 did. Id. at 2320. 
110. Id. at 2318 (citing H.B. 2, 83rd Leg., 2d Spec. Sess. (Tex. 2013)). 
111. Id. at 2319 (citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997)). 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
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Texas’s second argument was that a facial attack was not appropriate because 
the women affected by these laws are not a “large fraction” of Texas women of 
reproductive age, which Texas read Casey to require.114 The State spent much time 
arguing that Casey required as a denominator the number of women of reproductive 
age in Texas, and the numerator those women who lived more than 150 miles from 
an abortion facility that met H.B. 2 standards.115 Concluding that H.B. 2 would be 
a substantial burden only for seventeen percent of Texas women of reproductive 
age, it found that this was not “a large fraction” and thus not suitable for a facial 
attack.116 
The Court answered by clarifying that Casey used “large fraction” to refer to 
the situations in which the provision at issue directly impacts women, a class 
narrower than all women, pregnant women, or even the class of women seeking 
abortions identified by the state. It found that the “relevant denominator is ‘those 
women for whom the provision is an actual rather than an irrelevant restriction.’”117 
In Casey, where the Court struck down Pennsylvania’s spousal notification 
requirement, that provision was a substantial obstacle to only one percent of 
married women, but the Casey plurality upheld a facial invalidation of the entire 
provision. In Hellerstedt, the number of women burdened was even higher.118 
One may puzzle over this conclusion in Casey, since it seems tautological—
the actual number affected defines both numerator and denominator. If any women 
are burdened by a provision, then the provision may be challenged in a facial attack 
because of the actual effect on a few. In addition, this conclusion seems inconsistent 
with the plurality’s conclusion about the burdens of a twenty-four-hour waiting 
period in Casey. Although some women would have to travel more than 150 miles 
each way, the Court in Casey found that this burden did not support facial 
invalidation of the waiting period provision, presumably because it would not 
prevent those women from obtaining an abortion. Yet a similar large impact on a 
few women from spousal notification was enough for facial invalidation of that 
provision. 
Casey finessed the problem by saying that “[a] particular burden is not an 
undue burden,” suggesting that long travel time was not an undue burden even 
 
114. Id. at 2320. 
115. Texas included in the denominator women within 150 miles of the facility in McAllen, 
which had been found adequate on an as-applied basis. Even though there was no abortion facility that 
met H.B. 2 requirements, the state did argue that El Paso women should not be included because they 
were twelve miles away from a clinic in New Mexico. Ironically, that clinic would not have met H.B. 2 
requirements and was in another state. See Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier, 760 F.3d 448, 458–
59 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2536 (2016) (holding availability of abortion in a contiguous 
state should not count in determining the burden on women). 
116. Brief in Opposition at 10, Cole, 790 F.3d 563 (No. 15–274). 
117. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2320. 
118. According to Texas, 17% of women of reproductive age (200,000 women) would have to 
drive more than 150 miles each way to have an abortion, which it argued was not a “large fraction.” See 
Brief for Respondents at 45, 48, Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (No. 15-274). 
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though spousal notification was.119 If so, the difference was that the one percent of 
women for whom spousal notification was a substantial obstacle were burdened by 
a law that served no valid purpose, while the waiting period law did serve the valid 
purpose of informing women about the fetus and alternatives to abortion. 
That reasoning, however, still does not explain why the surgical center and 
admitting privileges requirements, which would be a substantial obstacle for 
seventeen percent of women according to the state, would invalidate those 
requirements for the rest of Texas women for whom it would not be a substantial 
obstacle. One might infer that it is because those provisions serve no valid health 
purpose, and thus they are invalid for all women, even if they directly burden a 
smaller percentage. In not providing a more complete explanation, the Court might 
have intended to give lower courts the authority to entertain facial attacks on 
abortion statutes even if very few women are actually burdened, which was 
apparently the situation before Gonzales.120 
VI. THE OPINIONS OF JUSTICE GINSBURG AND JUSTICE THOMAS 
There were three other opinions in the case: a concurrence by Justice Ginsburg 
and dissents by both Justices Thomas and Alito. Justice Alito argued that the Court 
is wrong, as Justice Thomas describes it, because its reasoning “creates an abortion 
exception to ordinary rules of res judicata, ignores compelling evidence that Texas’ 
law imposes no unconstitutional burden, and disregards basic principles of 
severability doctrine.”121 Because I have addressed Justice Alito’s evidentiary and 
severability objections in previous discussion, I focus on Justice Ginsburg’s 
concurrence and Justice Thomas’s dissent.122 
A. Justice Ginsburg’s Concurrence 
Justice Ginsburg’s sharp summary of the flaws of H.B. 2 adds no new 
argument, but deserves mention because it emphasizes the discriminatory aspect of 
the law and its impact on women. It is also a masterpiece of brevity.123 She finds 
claims that H.B. 2 will protect the health of women who experience complications 
from abortion are simply not credible, for “[i]n truth, complications from an 
abortion are both rare and rarely dangerous.”124 And procedures far more 
dangerous than abortion are not subjected to the same two restrictions. Given those 
 
119. Casey, 505 U.S. at 887. 
120. See Carhart, 550 U.S. at 163. This arguable inconsistency/ambiguity does not escape Justice 
Alito’s eye in his dissent. 
121. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2321 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
122. I have not discussed Justice Alito’s dissenting arguments on preclusion because they do 
not affect regulation of abortion generally. See supra note 34. 
123. She also relies extensively on amicus briefs to support her claims, especially those of the 
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Social Science Researchers, American Civil 
Liberties Union, and Ten Pennsylvania Abortion Providers. See Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2320–21 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
124. Id. at 2320 (quoting Schimel, 806 F.3d at 912). 
Final to Printer_Robertson (Do Not Delete) 3/14/2018  8:40 AM 
2017 ]  WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH V. HELLERSTEDT 641 
realities, “it is beyond rational belief that H.B. 2 could genuinely protect the health 
of women, and certain that the law ‘would simply make it more difficult for them 
to obtain abortions.’”125 “When a State severely limits access to safe and legal 
procedures, women in desperate circumstances may resort to unlicensed rogue 
practitioners . . . at great risk to their health and safety.”126 As long as the Court 
adheres to Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 
TRAP laws like H.B. 2 “that ‘do little or nothing for health, but rather strew 
impediments to abortion’ . . . cannot survive judicial inspection.”127 
B. Justice Thomas’s Dissent 
In dissenting, Justice Thomas writes both on general questions of substantive 
due process lawmaking and more specific ones about the majority’s transformation 
of “undue burden” into “strict scrutiny.”128 To him, neither is sound constitutional 
interpretation and neither gives guidance to courts that will have to apply the Court’s 
holding in the future. His attack on the majority begins with an argument against 
the permissive tradition of allowing third-party standing in abortion cases.129 
However, since that attack is more general than his resistance to the interest-
balancing under the undue burden test, I focus only on the latter arguments. 
Justice Thomas chiefly objects to the majority’s “reimagin[ing] the undue-
burden standard used to assess the constitutionality of abortion restrictions.”130 He 
states that Casey instructed courts to “look to whether a law substantially impedes 
women’s access to abortion, and whether it is reasonably related to legitimate state 
interests.”131 Although he is fundamentally opposed to the Court’s abortion 
jurisprudence, taking Casey as the baseline, he finds that the Court rewrites the 
standard in three ways. 
First, Justice Thomas claims that the majority’s acceptance of a standard 
comparing the burdens imposed on abortion access together with the benefits those 
laws confer, creates a “free-form balancing test . . . contrary to Casey.”132 However, 
his two supporting examples are not convincing. True, Casey had found that certain 
recordkeeping provisions served valid interests in research and public health 
without balancing burdens and benefits. But because the evidence showed that 
there was a public health benefit and no burden, there was nothing to balance. 
Similarly, Justice Thomas’s claim that that Casey’s invalidation of spousal notice 
 
125. Id. at 2321 (quoting Schimel, 806 F.3d at 910). This statement suggests that the legislative 
purpose was itself invalid, but she says nothing more about a purpose analysis. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. (quoting Schimel, 806 F.3d at 921). 
128. Id. at 2324–30 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
129. Id. at 2321; Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976) (holding a physician may assert the 
right of women patients against government interference with the abortion decision). 
130. Id. at 2323. 
131. Id. Here he quotes language from Casey relating to promoting life of unborn, not regulation 
of health. He also omits the “unnecessary language” of Casey.  
132. Id. at 2324. 
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without balancing supports his position is also not persuasive. The evidence showed 
a significant burden for the one percent of women directly affected but no 
legitimate benefit to balance against the burden on those women who were 
burdened.133 
Second, Justice Thomas cites to Mazurek v. Armstrong134 as a post-Casey case, 
which upheld a law requiring that only doctors, not qualified nurse practitioners, 
perform abortions even though there were no evidence of health benefits from the 
law. Indeed, the Court said in that case the state had broad latitude to decide that 
particular functions may be performed only by licensed professionals, “even if an 
objective assessment might suggest that those same tasks could be performed by others.”135 
Justice Thomas is correct that no direct balancing occurred in Mazurek, but the 
Court confronted a record in which the licensing requirement did not create a 
substantial burden because women still had access to abortion. Again, there was 
nothing to balance. Going forward, courts may have to reconsider licensing laws if 
they provided little benefit and burdened women.136 
Third, Justice Thomas argues that the Court has changed its position in Casey, 
reiterated in Gonzales, that legislatures, not courts, have the authority to resolve 
questions of medical uncertainty as long as there is a rational basis for their action. 
He writes that Casey’s invalidation of the spousal notice law was not to the contrary 
because disputed evidence about the impact of that law was not a medical dispute.137 
In Justice Thomas’s view these deviations from prior cases “will surely mystify 
lower courts for years to come” since the majority simply highlights certain facts in 
the record that seem significant to them in establishing an undue burden.138 Justice 
Thomas laments that the Court appears to be imposing a strict scrutiny test for 
abortion, requiring the most compelling justification for any restriction, thus ruling 
out even minor, previously valid regulation of abortion.139 Moreover, he is disturbed 
because, by second guessing medical evidence and making its own assessment of 
whether a law or regulation achieves an actual benefit, the “majority reappoints this 
Court as ‘the country’s ex officio medical board with powers to disapprove medical 
and operative practices and standards throughout the United States.’”140 He also 
worries about the burden imposed on states by making them guess how strong or 
compelling their health interests must be to pass muster.141 
 
133. This was the point of the searing language presumably written by Justice O’Connor in 
Casey about how women are no longer the property of their husbands. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 833. 
134. See Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968 (1997) (per curiam). 
135. Id. at 973 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 885); see also Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 164 (citing Mazurek, 
520 U.S. at 973). 
136. See infra note 92 and accompanying text. 
137. Nor was Gonzales’ invalidation of Congress’s finding that there was never a medical 
necessity because there was in fact a debate within the medical community (which was left to the 
legislature to decide). 
138. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2326. 
139. Id. at 2326 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
140. Id. (quoting Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 164). 
141. Id. 
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If reproductive choice is not a fundamental right and can be regulated if there 
is a rational basis for legislative action, Justice Thomas’s position makes sense. But 
the Court in Hellerstedt is taking the abortion right seriously, which means subjecting 
it to more than rational basis scrutiny if a law burdens access to abortion. 
Hellerstedt ’s view of “undue burden,” however, is not necessarily equivalent to strict 
scrutiny, even if modest restrictions may have to be justified. A more confined 
decision rule for undue burden may be desirable, but there are limits to how one 
would specify in advance the fact-based comparison of actual benefits and burdens 
that determine when an “undue burden” exists.142 As in other litigation, it is 
unavoidable that judges will make inferences from record evidence within the 
constraints given to them and decide accordingly.143 
Some laws, like record-keeping for public health and research purposes, are 
easily sustained because they impose slight or no burden and provide benefit. 
Others, like licensing laws, long believed proper, may have to be rethought in  
terms of their burdens and benefits.144 Nor is the fear of the courts becoming ex 
officio medical boards based likely to be realized. The courts would step in only 
where evidence of health benefit has highly questionable factual support. In short, 
Justice Thomas’s objections are to the post-Griswold 145 structure of fundamental 
reproductive rights in general and the closer scrutiny that that status entails. 
VII. FUTURE ISSUES: THE IMPACT OF HELLERSTEDT 
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt is a major setback for the antichoice 
movement. It will most likely invalidate most TRAP laws, which usually only 
marginally advance health while making it more difficult for women to access 
abortion. Hellerstedt, however, will not stop the antichoice movement from pressing 
its fight against abortion in other areas, even before President Trump makes two 
appointments to the Court. It now controls many state legislatures, and more 
legislation in areas left open by Hellerstedt may be expected. 
Of course, the future of abortion regulation after Hellerstedt will be affected by 
the makeup of the Court. As noted earlier, Justice Gorsuch, who replaced Justice 
Scalia, alone will not shift the balance. Assuming that Justice Ginsberg, Breyer, 
 
142. See generally Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1 (2004) 
(discussing how many Supreme Court decisions concern fashioning decision rules for implementing 
constitutional principles). 
143. Mark Tushnet makes the same point more insightfully. He states that: 
[R]ule-guided judgments were not in principle different from clinical ones (or, to put the 
latter in terms more congenial to lawyers, from all-things-considered judgments) . . . . A 
clinical judgment was just the result of an accumulation of rule-guided judgments that could 
be teased out through careful analysis, and the judgments reached in a system of complex 
rules could never be fully justified by any identifiable subset of rules. 
Mark Tushnet, Jan Deutsch: An Appreciation, BALKINIZATION (Aug. 20, 2016, 12:21 PM), https://
balkin.blogspot.com/2016/08/jan-deutsch-appreciation.html [https://perma.cc/TXJ9-3ZFB]. 
144. See infra note 91 and accompanying text. 
145. See Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2324 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating “fundamental[ ] 
oppos[ition]” to the Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence and criticizing the transformation of the 
undue burden test into a strict scrutiny equivalent). 
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Kagan, and Sotomayor remain for the foreseeable future, the power of Hellerstedt 
will depend on Justice Kennedy remaining on the Court.146 Having joined the Casey 
plurality that upheld the core right of Roe to abortion up until viability, he is likely 
to maintain that commitment in situations that directly impair that right, as he did 
in Hellerstedt. His vote in Gonzales to uphold the federal ban on partial birth abortion 
is not inconsistent with this commitment, since that case involved only one 
particular rare technique, and did not prevent women from getting abortions by 
other means, including causing fetal demise in utero.147 Although the Gonzales 
opinion was highly deferential to state resolution of medical and scientific 
uncertainty, he left room for an as-applied attack if the technique was needed to 
protect a woman’s health.148 Assuming his continued presence on the Court, the 
reliability of Justice Kennedy’s vote in future cases will thus depend on the type of 
regulation at issue. The important questions for him are: does the regulation 
improve information exchange, does it advance respect for prenatal life, is there an 
actual health benefit, and is there a substantial effect on access to abortion and its 
impact on women seeking abortion. 
A. Health, Licensure, and Informed Consent Restrictions 
If Hellerstedt ’s doctrine is taken seriously in future disputes, the case will make 
it harder to restrict abortion both health-related and fetal-protection regulation. 
Regulations that purport to protect women’s health and autonomy will have to 
follow Hellerstedt and provide real benefit if they substantially limit access to 
abortion. But close questions may still arise. 
For example, what if a state has a valid health justification for a regulation that 
closes the only clinic in the state, which could occur in Mississippi?149 Should health 
take priority over access or vice versa? The answer should turn on the requirement’s 
contribution to women’s health. A state, for example, should be able to close the 
only clinic in the state if it were as derelict as the Gosnell clinic. That case, however, 
is easy—one could show serious danger to women’s health and life that would be 
comparable or even greater than the risk of childbirth. But the question is harder if 
 
146. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2292. There has been speculation in the press that the appointment 
of Justice Gorsuch, who had clerked for Justice Kennedy, will reassure him that future Trump 
appointees will be of high quality, and thus might lead him to retire sooner than he otherwise would. If 
he did, that would be a major blow to abortion rights. 
147. “[I]n some circumstances, it appears likely an injection that kills the fetus is an alternative 
under the Act that allows the doctor to perform the procedure.” Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 164. Still, he did 
include paternalistic language about the regret that women would feel if they later learned the details of 
the intact dilation and evacuation that they had had. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 159–60. One would have 
thought that informing them of those details before the procedure, rather than banning it altogether, 
would have been more protective of women’s interests. 
148. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 167–69. 
149. See Jonathan Will, Whole Woman’s Health—Some Preliminary Thoughts on Benefits, 
Purposes, and Fetal Status, BILL OF HEALTH ( June 29, 2016), http://blogs.harvard.edu/billofhealth/
2016/06/29/whole-womans-health-some-preliminary-thoughts-on-benefits-purposes-and-fetal-
status/ [https://perma.cc/MF9D-NPEK]. 
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the health benefit is less but still substantial. Must the state allow even a substandard 
abortion facility to exist, when access is available through acceptable facilities across 
a state line?150 
Challenges to licensing laws that require only physicians to perform abortions 
can also be close under Hellerstedt ’s emphasis on real medical benefit. For example, 
Mazurek v. Armstrong upheld a Montana ban on a physician assistant performing 
first trimester abortions even though she was qualified, in part because there the 
petitioners did not argue that the law burdened access.151 The Court simply relied 
on the language in Roe and Casey that stated states may require only licensed doctors 
to perform abortions.152 But after Hellerstedt such bans may be challenged if 
physicians are not available to meet abortion needs and physician assistants or nurse 
practitioners are adequately trained and supervised.153 
Similarly, restrictions on use of telemedicine for prescribing abortion drugs to 
women in rural areas, which some states have enacted, may also be subjected to 
scrutiny in light of Hellerstedt.154 Such restrictions could apply both to prescriptions 
by doctors and by nurse practitioners and physician assistants. If a state permits a 
doctor generally to treat and prescribe by telemedicine, under Hellerstedt, a ban on 
prescribing medication abortions should not stand. A similar result should follow 
for nurse practitioners and physician assistants who are permitted to treat and 
prescribe remotely except for medication abortions. Such cases should turn on 
whether telemedicine restrictions provide an actual health benefit without imposing 
a substantial obstacle to access. 
Hellerstedt dealt with health restrictions on abortion, but its emphasis on actual 
facts could support new challenges to informed consent and waiting period laws. 
Casey was very lenient with states that wanted to impose a waiting period, and has 
been used as authority for states to extend their laws from twenty-four- to forty-
eight- or seventy-two-hour waiting periods.155 A new challenge to waiting periods 
might be successful if data shows how burdensome such requirements are for 
women in rural areas with long driving distances, overnight stays, and low income. 
Women in those circumstances might argue that less restrictive rules, such as 
 
150. See Currier, 760 F.3d at 457–58. 
151. Mazurek, 520 U.S. at 968. 
152. Id. at 973–74. 
153. See Ian Lovett, California Expands Availability of Abortions, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/10/us/california-expands-availability-of-abortions.html; Auren 
Weinberg, Ensure Practice Staff Works to the Top of Their License, PHYSICIAN’S PRACTICE (Apr. 28, 
2016), http://www.physicianspractice.com/articles/ensure-practice-staff-works-top-their-license 
[https://perma.cc/Y7TY-LZL9] (arguing that having non-MD providers practice to “the top of their 
license” would reflect the movement in health policy to a more efficient and quality/outcome 
approach). 
154. See Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc. v. Iowa Bd. of Med., 865 N.W.2d 252, 253 
(Iowa 2015); E. Ray Dorsey & Eric Topol, State of Telehealth, NEW ENG. J. MED. 154, 155 (2016). 
155. See ALA. CODE § 26–623A–4 (2014) (forty-eight hours); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-
21.82 (West 2015) (seventy-two hours); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76–67–305 (West 2016) (72 hours); see 
also Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Daugarrd, 799 F. Supp. 2d 1048 (D.S.D. 2011) (issuing 
a temporary injunction against the seventy-two-hour waiting period in South Dakota). 
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informed consent by Skype or other means, should be as effective in informing 
women as face-to-face meeting with the provider. 
Finally, Hellerstedt has also breathed new life into the viability of facial attacks 
on abortion laws. Gonzales had landed a hard punch against abortion rights with its 
apparent rejection of facial attacks when as-applied challenges by affected 
individuals could be brought.156 Hellerstedt, however, upheld a facial challenge to 
H.B. 2 even when the total number of women affected overall was small because 
the burden for that small number had no medical justification. Hellerstedt thus 
appears to have restored facial challenges to the role that they had prior to Gonzales 
status.157 
B. Respect for Fetal Life and Dignity Strategies 
With Hellerstedt having given abortion rights proponents a victory in the battle 
over health-related abortion curbs, abortion opponents going forward are likely to 
focus attention on respect for potential life and the dignity of fetuses prior to 
viability, which Casey and Gonzales had permitted. Several new kinds of abortion 
limitation are being sought under this rubric, but all are likely to fail unless Roe’s 
core right to terminate pre-viable pregnancy is altered. 
1. Twenty-Week Ban on Abortion 
The most significant new effort, already adopted in fifteen states, is the 
movement toward a twenty-week ban on abortion based on claims of fetal pain. At 
present, twenty-weeks is two-to-four weeks prior to most medical assessments 
about viability (the ability to survive outside of the womb). A twenty-week ban 
would thus be constitutionally acceptable only if viability were no longer the cutoff 
line for abortion—a decision that only the Supreme Court can make.158 Proponents 
of the twenty-week ban argue that ability to feel pain—an indication of the humanity 
of the fetus—should substitute for viability. Yet this view has little medical or 
scientific support159of when sentience is highly contested. Most scientists and 
physicians knowledgeable about the issues believe that pain sensitivity arises only at 
twenty-four to twenty-six weeks or later, because only then are cortical networks 
and neural receptors fully developed.160 
 
156. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 167–69. 
157. Id. at 187–89 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
158. See McCormack v. Herzog, 788 F.3d 1017, 1029 (9th Cir. 2015); Isaacson v. Horne, 716 
F.3d 1213, 1222–25 (9th Cir. 2013). A North Dakota law banning abortion whenever a heartbeat was 
detectable was struck down on similar grounds—it conflicted with Supreme Court precedents 
protecting the right to abortion before viability. See MKB Mgmt. Corp. v. Stenehjem, 795 F.3d 768, 773 
(8th Cir. 2016). 
159. See John Robertson, Abortion and Technology: Sonograms, Fetal Pain, Viability, and Early 
Prenatal Diagnosis, 14 U. PENN. J. CONST. L. 327, 365 (2011) [ hereinafter Robertson, Abortion and 
Technology]; see also John Robertson, Science Disputes in Abortion Law, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1849 (2015) 
[ hereinafter Robertson, Science Disputes in Abortion Law]. 
160. See Robertson, Abortion and Technology, supra note 159, at 365–66. 
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States that have adopted the twenty-week ban have relied on the opinion of a 
small group of neuroscientists and doctors who believe otherwise, akin to giving 
credence to a few scientists who question climate change science.161 They rely on 
language in Gonzales that purports to limit judicial review of contested scientific 
findings, thereby allowing legislative-backed minorities to carry the day on fetal 
pain.162 However, if courts may make their own independent assessment of medical 
and scientific claims, as Hellerstedt teaches, courts could find no scientific basis for 
the twenty-week ban, which substantially impacts women in that situation. Even if 
the Court allowed sentience, not viability, to define the cutoff point, under Gonzales 
the fetus could still be killed in utero prior to removal or expulsion from the body.163 
2. A Ban on Fetal Dismemberment 
A second fetal protective strategy now touted by abortion opponents is to ban 
dilation and evacuation abortions that lead to the dismemberment and piecemeal 
removal of fetal parts on the ground that this procedure is an affront to human 
dignity.164 This strategy appears based on the concerns that Justice Kennedy’s 
Gonzales opinion cited in upholding the federal partial-birth abortion law. The 
cosponsor of such a law in Arkansas called dilation and evacuation a “gruesome, 
barbaric procedure” and “one that no civilized society should embrace.”165 
In that case, however, the crushing the skull of the fetus occurred after partial 
removal from the uterus, thus blurring the line between abortion and birth. The 
proposed laws, however, ban in utero procedures on fetuses that are not yet in the 
birth canal, which avoids the blurring that concerned Justice Kennedy.166 Moreover, 
such laws would render illegal the most common method of second-trimester 
abortion, thus imposing a substantial obstacle to abortion access. The state of 
Alabama argued in a challenge to such a law that a standard D&E could occur if 
the abortionist first caused fetal demise, citing injection of potassium chloride or 
digoxin into the fetus or transection of its umbilical cord as ways to achieve that 
end. The plaintiffs’ experts, however, testified that achieving fetal demise in those 
ways was far beyond the capabilities of doctors in abortion clinics, and would 
increase the burdens on women undergoing those abortions. The district court 
agreed, even with the gain in human dignity so questionable, and issued a 
preliminary injunction against the law. Presumably the proponents of such laws 
 
161. See id. at 365–67. 
162. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 163–64. 
163. See id. A concurring judge in Isaacson reached the same conclusion. Isaacson, 716 F.3d at 
1231–32. 
164. See Katia Desrouleaux, Banning Partial-Birth Abortion at All Costs—Gonzales v. Carhart: 
Three Decades of Supreme Court Precedent “Down the Drain,” 35 S.U. L. REV. 543, 548 (2008) (describing 
the D&E process). 
165. Kelly Weill, New Law Lets Dads Veto Abortions, THE DAILY BEAST (Feb. 2, 2017, 9:00 
PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2017/02/02/new-law-lets-dads-veto-abortions.html 
[https://perma.cc/2MXQ-LH9R] (quoting Arkansas Rep. Andy Mayberry). 
166. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 157–60. 
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would allow termination of pregnancy only by medication or induction of a very 
early preterm birth, which might lengthen the abortion process and thus deter some 
women from choosing it. Moreover, the gain in human dignity is questionable if the 
terminated fetus will emerge stillborn or die very shortly thereafter.167 
3. Disposition of Fetal Remains 
A third strategy for demonstrating respect for fetuses—requiring that they be 
cremated or buried after abortion, not merely flushed or incinerated as other 
medical waste—has already foundered in Indiana and Texas. Under Hellerstedt, it is 
likely to do so in others as well. 
The Indiana case arose from a law signed in 2016 by Indiana Governor Mike 
Pence, which was preliminarily enjoined by a district court just before taking 
effect.168 Even though the court found that the law did not infringe a fundamental 
right, it did find that the opponents of the law were likely to succeed on the merits 
because the state’s interest in treating “fetal remains with ‘the same’ dignity as 
human remains” is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.169 
The state interest was not legitimate even under a lenient rational basis standard 
because the Supreme Court has held that for Fourteenth Amendment purposes the 
fetus is not a person, thus treating its remains with the same dignity and respect 
given human remains has no constitutional basis.170 
The judge found that while Indiana’s formulations of its interest “are not 
premised on a fetus being the same as a person, they are premised on the related 
principle that fetal tissue is entitled to a more respectful, dignified, or humane 
disposition because it, like human remains, in some sense represents life.”171 Yet 
the State cited no legal authority that recognizes this premise as a legitimate interest. 
Nor did the court find that the protection of potential life recognized as legitimate 
in Casey and Gonzales apply, because fetal remains have no potential for human life. 
Those interests are legitimate only during stages of pregnancy when there is a 
potential life, not after the pregnancy has been terminated.172 
The Texas case arose when its Health and Human Services Commission 
(TSHS) issued a similar regulation four days after Hellerstedt to “affirm the value 
 
167. Those concerns might also be minimized by in utero killing of the second-trimester fetus 
prior to dismemberment, as Gonzales permitted to avoid the ban on partial birth abortion. See id. 
168. See Planned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky, Inc. v. Comm’s, Indiana Dep’t of 
Health, 194 F. Supp. 3d 818, 822 (S.D. Ind. 2016). 
169. Id. at 832. 
170. See id. 
171. Id. at 832. 
172. See id. at 833. Even if the state had some power to symbolize respect for fetal remains, 
there would still be the question of undue burden. Complying with the Indiana law would cost between 
$36,000 and $63,000 a year including an additional $5,000–$9,000 upfront cost to purchase a crypt at a 
cemetery and to periodically open close the crypt to deposit cremains. Id. at 825. The impact of the 
additional cost on access to abortion might constitute an undue burden. 
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and dignity of all life.”173 A federal district court issued a preliminary injunction 
against that rule on January 27, 2016.174 The regulation prohibited the previously 
accepted method of incineration and deposition in a sanitary landfill, and now 
required only interment or cremation with interment as a permissible means of 
disposing of fetal remains. 
The district court found that there was evidence showing that the stated 
interest “is a pretext for its true purpose, restricting abortion.”175 Even if that were 
not its purpose, the Court was not persuaded that its alleged interest in “protecting 
the dignity of the unborn” was a legitimate one. While the Supreme Court has 
acknowledged that the State has an “important and legitimate interest in protecting 
the potentiality of human life[,]”176 the Court found “that the Amendments do not 
further such a legitimate state interest . . . [because] they regulate activities after a 
miscarriage, ectopic pregnancy, or abortion—activities when there is no potential 
life to respect.”177 
Alternatively, even assuming that “protecting the dignity of the unborn” is a 
legitimate state interest, the Court applied the Hellerstedt balancing test and found 
that the “burdens on abortion access substantially outweigh the benefits.”178 
Assessing the benefits, the Department of State Health Services (DSHS) undercut 
the strength of the asserted benefit by recommending that “healthcare providers 
place fetal tissue in a single container, commingle fetal tissue from various 
procedures together, and freeze the tissue until disposal can be secured . . . .”179 
DSHS was not able to explain how this better protects the dignity of the unborn, 
nor why fetal tissue must be treated differently at home than in a doctor’s office. 
Turning to the burdens imposed by the DSHS rule, the Court found that 
restricting disposal of fetal tissue consistent with the disposal of human remains will 
impose burdens on abortion access. DSHS’s “back of the envelope” estimate that 
the ash from all abortions could be buried for one time for only $300 per year 
ignored the reality of the 280,000 square miles that comprised the State and the 5.4 
million women of reproductive age living there. The plaintiffs showed that the costs 
would be considerably greater because of transportation and administrative costs 
and vendor availability. The Amendments would also pose significant logistical 
 
173. Asher Price, Proposed Rules: Bury or Cremate Fetal Remains, AUSTIN AM. STATESMAN, July 
8, 2016, at A1. 
174. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 231 F. Supp. 3d 218 ( W.D. Tex. 2017). 
175. Id. at 229. 
176. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846. 
177. Hellerstedt, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 229. The Court also noted that the State appeared “to be 
inferentially establishing the beginning of human life at conception, potentially undermining the 
constitutional protection afforded to personal beliefs and central to the liberty protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. 
178. See id. at 230. 
179. See id. 
Final to Printer_Robertson (Do Not Delete) 3/14/2018  8:40 AM 
650 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:623 
challenges for healthcare providers in terms of sorting procedure, storage, 
transportation, and ultimate disposal.180 
Finally, there was only one funeral provider licensed and willing to bury fetal 
remains available for the entire state of Texas, and that provider had no experience 
with fetal tissue.181 Nor had they experienced the controversy that might arise once 
it became known that that funeral home was in the fetal burial business. An offer 
from the Catholic Bishops of Texas to bury all fetal remains at no charge in a 
Catholic cemetery foundered because that organization had not obtained the 
required permits for doing so, and if they had, the likelihood that women of other 
faiths might object to burial in a Catholic cemetery would block that alternative. 
While the Indiana and Texas decisions involve preliminary injunctions that 
have not yet been reviewed on appeal, they show the roadblocks that statues will 
encounter in imposing such requirement. The question of whether a legitimate 
interest in potential life exists when the fetus is dead will be difficult to overcome. 
Even if it is legitimate, the benefits of fetal disposal law will still have to overcome 
Hellerstedt’s requirement that those benefits outweigh the burdens on access which 
they create. 
4. No Discrimination Among Fetuses 
Bans on abortion for particular reasons are a fourth area of fetal protection 
that also lacks traction, even before Hellerstedt. States have passed laws banning 
abortion decisions on account of the sex, race, or mental status of fetuses.182 These 
laws purport to extend discrimination that would be illegal once the child was born 
to fetuses prior to birth. Such laws call into question whether states may limit 
abortions based on particular characteristics of fetuses or on the motivation of 
women. 
A good example of such efforts is Indiana’s 2016 law that would outlaw 
abortions on the basis of “the fetus’s race, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, or 
diagnosis or potential diagnosis of the fetus having Down syndrome or any other 
disability.”183 The district court granted a preliminary injunction against the law’s 
implementation because it violated the right recognized in Roe and Casey to 
 
180. Id. There was also evidence that the burial requirements could cause women grief and 
shame, possible discouraging them from obtaining abortion and miscarriage management from a 
medical facility. Id. at 230–31. 
181. The owner of that home had testified that he expected health care providers to 
“individually wrap the fetal tissue in cloth and tape so he could transport the tissue, up to twenty-five 
units at a time, on a stretcher.” Id. at 231. 
182. See also Pub. L. No. 213-2016 (codified as amended in scattered sections of IND. CODE 
ANN. § 16). See generally ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §13–3603.02 (2011). For an overview of states  
with those restrictions please see Abortion Bans in Cases of Sex or Race Selection or Genetic Anomaly, 
GUTTMACHER INST. ( Jan. 1, 2017), https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/abortion-
bans-cases-sex-or-race-selection-or-genetic-anomaly [https://perma.cc/RZQ2-7TBL]. 
183. H. 1337, 119th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2016). The term disability did not include 
“a lethal fetal anomaly.” Id. Note that such laws would prevent a woman infected with the Zika virus, 
which causes microencephaloy in offspring, to terminate pregnancy. 
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terminate pregnancy prior to viability. This right is categorical and does not depend 
on the genetic or other characteristics of the fetus or a woman’s motivation in 
choosing an abortion. To hold otherwise would require the district court to 
recognize an exception, which has never existed, not to mention the Hydra-headed 
implementation problems that would arise in assessing the importance of the 
various situations that lead women to terminate pregnancy. 
Nor do technological advances that allow earlier and more accurate diagnosis 
of Down syndrome or other disabilities and more abortions for those reasons 
change the situation. As the district court said, while “the [s]tate’s interest in 
protecting and even promoting potential life is a legitimate one, the Supreme Court 
has already weighed this interest . . . .”184 Because this is the central holding of Roe 
and Casey, technological advances in prenatal screening and diagnosis that increase 
the number of abortions cannot override it.185 On the other hand, laws mandating 
provision of information, for example, about life with a Down syndrome child 
would be acceptable, as long as the woman’s right to abort is still respected.186 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, Hellerstedt has drastically reoriented the terms of the abortion debate 
and has shrunk the field of play for opponents within the confines of Roe and Casey. 
Pretextual or ill-considered health restrictions will not stand, and precedents about 
licensure and waiting periods may now have to be rethought. While licensure, 
informed consent, and nonfunding laws may survive, abortion opponents are 
increasingly relegated to measures that attack the right to abort before viability. But 
that avenue is foreclosed until Roe and Casey are modified. 
As long as the current politics of abortion remain, opponents will continue to 
fight hard to limit abortion with direct restrictions, even while greater access to 
contraception and sex education may be more successful in lowering abortion rates. 
A future Court different in makeup may change the law of abortion. Until then, the 







184. Planned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 3d at 828. The State also 
advanced a “binary choice” interpretation of Roe and Casey that viewed a woman as either choosing to 
have an abortion or not. If she chooses not to, she would not be able to change her mind on a 
discriminatory basis. The court found this argument equally unpersuasive. Id. at 828–29. 
185. See John Robertson, Abortion and Technology, supra note 159, at 370–79, for a discussion 
of noninvasive prenatal diagnosis that could occur on the basis of a blood test alone. Nor could the 
tests on which such earlier prenatal diagnosis occur be banned. See id. at 372; see also Jaimie S. King, And 
Genetic Testing for All . . . The Coming Revolution in Non-Invasive Prenatal Genetic Testing, 42 RUTGERS 
L.J. 599 (2011). 
186. John Robertson, Abortion and Technology, supra note 159, at 381. 
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